1. Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit. 2. International Regulation without International Government: Improving IO Performance through Orchestration

1. A new kind of international regulatory system is spontaneously arising out of the failure of international 'Old Governance' (i.e., treaties and intergovernmental organizations) to adequately regulate international business. Nongovernmental organizations, business firms, and other actors, singly and in novel combinations, are creating innovative institutions to apply transnational norms to business. These institutions are predominantly private and operate through voluntary standards. The Authors depict the diversity of these new regulatory institutions on the 'Governance Triangle,' according to the roles of different actors in their operations. To analyze this complex system, we adapt the domestic 'New Governance' model of regulation to the international setting. 'Transnational New Governance' potentially provides many benefits of New Governance and is particularly suitable for international regulation because it demands less of states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). However, Transnational New Governance does require states and IGOs to act as orchestrators of the international regulatory system, and that system currently suffers from a significant orchestration deficit. If states and IGOs expanded 'directive' and especially 'facilitative' orchestration of the Transnational New Governance system, they could strengthen high-quality private regulatory standards, improve the international regulatory system, and better achieve their own regulatory goals. 2. International organizations (IOs) have been widely criticized as ineffective. Yet scholars and practitioners assessing IO performance frequently focus on traditional modes of governance such as treaties and inter-state dispute-resolution mechanisms. When they observe poor performance, moreover, they often prescribe a strengthening of those same activities. We call this reliance on traditional state-based mechanisms 'International Old Governance' (IOG). A better way to understand and improve IO performance is to consider the full range of ways in which IOs can and do operate - including, increasingly, by reaching out to private actors and institutions, collaborating with them, and supporting and shaping their activities. Such actions are helping to develop an intricate global network of public, private and mixed institutions and norms, partially orchestrated by IOs, that we call 'Transnational New Governance' (TNG). With proper orchestration by IOs, TNG can ameliorate both 'state failure' - the inadequacies of IOG - and 'market failure' - the problems that result when the creation and evolution of norm-setting institutions is highly decentralized. Orchestration thus provides a significant way for IOs to improve their regulatory performance. Some IOs already engage actively with private actors and institutions - we provide a range of illustrations, highlighting the activities of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Yet there remains a significant 'orchestration deficit' that provides real opportunities for IOs. We draw on the lessons of existing IO activities to suggest additional possibilities for improving IO performance. -- 1. Ein internationales regulatorisches System neuer Art entsteht derzeit spontan aus dem Versagen der internationalen 'Old Governance' - also der bestehenden internationalen Verträge und Organisationen - dabei, den internationalen Handel angemessen zu regulieren. Nichtregierungsorganisationen, Unternehmen und andere Akteure - allein und in ganz neuen Kombinationen - schaffen sich neue internationale Einrichtungen, um transnationale Normen auf internationale Geschäftstätigkeit anzuwenden. Es geht dabei vornehmlich um private Einrichtungen, die vor allem über freiwillige Standardbefolgung wirken. In diesem Beitrag werden die unterschiedlichen Regulierungseinrichtungen als Teil eines 'Governance Dreiecks' beschreiben und das geschieht vor allem in Blick darauf, welche Rollen die unterschiedlichen Akteure in ihrer Tätigkeit spielen. Um dieses komplexe System zu untersuchen passen wir das innenpolitische Regulierungsmodell der 'New Governance' an den internationalen Rahmen an. Die 'Transnational New Governance' enthält viele Vorteile der 'New Governance' und sie ist für die internationale Regulierung besonders angemessen, weil sie geringere Anforderungen an die Staatenwelt und an die intergouvernementalen Organisationen, die IGOs, stellen. Allerdings ist es für eine wirksame 'Transnational New Governance' weiterhin erforderlich, dass die Staaten und die IGOs das internationale regulatorische System 'orchestrieren'. Das heutige internationale regulatorische System leidet allerdings unter einem Orchestrierungsdefizit. Würden die Staaten und die IGOs die 'anweisende' und 'ermöglichende' Orchestrierungsfunktion des 'Transnational New Governance System' ausbauen, dann stärkten sie die privaten regulatorischen Standards von hoher Qualität, verbesserten das internationale regulatorische System und könnten ihre eigenen regulatorischen Ziele besser verwirklichen. 2. Internationale Organisationen (IOs) werden vielfach ob Ihrer Ineffizienz kritisiert. Allerdings konzentrieren sich Wissenschaftler und Praktiker bei dieser Bewertung der Leistungsfähigkeit von IOs häufig auf Maßstäbe, die den herkömmlichen Formen von Governance - wie internationalen Verträgen und den Mechanismen für die Schlichtung zwischenstaatlicher Konflikte - entlehnt sind. Soweit eine ungenügende Leistung festgestellt wird, empfehlen sie zudem meist, Tätigkeiten der traditionellen Art zu verstärken. Wir bezeichnen dies als ein Sich-Verlassen auf die herkömmlichen staats-basierten Mechanismen, als 'International Old Governance' (IOG). Man versteht die IOs besser und verbessert ihre Leistungsfähigkeit aber der Situation weitaus angemessener, wenn man die gesamte Vielfalt wirklicher und möglicher IO-Tätigkeiten in den Blick nimmt: Das umfasst vor allem, dass die IOs private Akteure und Organisationen einbeziehen, mit ihnen zusammenarbeiten, ihre Aktivitäten stützen, sie formen und ihnen Richtung geben. Diese Tätigkeiten schaffen ein fein gesponnenes globales Netzwerk von öffentlichen, privaten und gemischten Organisationen und Normen, das seinerseits teilweise durch die IOs orchestriert wird. Dieses Netzwerk bezeichnen wir als 'Transnational New Governance' (TNG). Wenn die Orchestrierung durch IOs gut funktioniert kann sie auch Staatsversagen (state failure) abmildern - also hier die Inadäquanzen von 'International Organization Governance' - und ebenso kann sie Marktversagen ausgleichen, also die Probleme, die sich ergeben wenn Herausbildung und Schaffung normgebender Einrichtungen höchst dezentralisiert verläuft. Über die Orchestrierung können die IOs auch die Leistungsfähigkeit ihrer Regulierungen erhöhen. Einige IOs sind schon jetzt stark zusammen mit privaten Akteuren und Einrichtungen unterwegs; in diesem Beitrag mustern wir das Spektrum solcher Aktivitäten. Wir betonen dabei die Unternehmungen des UN Environment Programme (UNEP), des Umweltprogramms der VN. Allerdings verbleibt ein erhebliches 'Orchestrierungsdefizit', das für die IOs zugleich Herausforderung und Chance ist. Wir stützten uns auf den Erfahrungsschatz der vorgefundenen IO-Aktivitäten, um den Möglichkeitsraum der IOs für die Zukunft auszumessen und Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Leistungsfähigkeit von IOs anzuregen.

Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism

In this Article I hope to take at least a step toward clarifying these matters by presenting a framework for the analysis of antiterrorism sanctions and using that framework to discuss several of the sanctions that the United States currently employs. Parts Two and Three of this Article set out the elements of the framework. Part Two begins by describing the varying forms or levels of state involvement in terrorism, shown graphically in Figure 1. All forms of state involvement are not alike, at least analytically, and Part Two will discuss the appropriateness of employing sanctions or other measures of influence against different levels of involvement. Part Three will describe in general terms, without reference to the problem of terrorism, the four principal rationales for the use of economic sanctions. Figure 2 depicts these rationales. Part Four of this Article will then join these two elements together, producing the matrix shown in Figure 3. The levels of state involvement appear on the horizontal axis of this matrix and the rationales for sanctions appear on the vertical axis. Part Four will sketch the application of the four sanctions rationales to state involvement in terrorism--the four rows of the matrix--and illustrate their application with examples from current American sanctions

Introduction Symposium: The Political Economy of International Trade Law and Policy

As this Introduction is written, the law of international trade stands at a major crossroads. In Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate are attempting to consolidate two massive omnibus trade bills.\u27 These bills authorize the President to enter into a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, amend the import relief laws, prescribe measures to deal with unfair foreign trade practices, and in general affect virtually every area of United States law concerned with international trade. Provisions like the Gephardt Amendment,2 designed to exert pressure on countries which have large trade surpluses and engage in trade practices that the United States considers unreasonable, have been criticized as mean-spirited 3 and protectionist, although the reality is considerably more complex

Economic Integration in the Americas: A Work in Progress

In the next section of the article, we provide an overview of the major subregional groupings and other institutional relationships now being created throughout Latin America. In Section III, we suggest two major goals that should guide the process of economic integration in the Americas: maintaining the multilateral economic system as the highest priority for the region and achieving regional integration at the hemispheric level. We then outline the principal approaches to economic integration currently being followed, or proposed, within the region-including bilateral agreements, subregional groupings, the expansion of NAFrA, and arrangements of continental scaleand assess these approaches as methods of achieving the stated goals. In the final section of the article, we suggest a different approach: an institutional mechanism that would take account of current political and economic realities, yet set the Hemisphere firmly on the path to economic integration within the multilateral economic system

Choosing low-cost institutions in global governance

Contemporary global governance takes place not only through formal inter-governmental organizations and treaties, but increasingly through diverse institutional forms including informal inter-governmental organizations, trans-governmental networks, and transnational public–private partnerships. Although these forms differ in many ways, they are all what we call ‘low-cost institutions’ (LCIs): the costs of creating, operating, changing, and exiting them, and the sovereignty costs they impose, are substantially lower on average than those of treaty-based institutions. LCIs also provide substantive and political governance benefits based on their low costs, including reduced risk, malleability, and flexibility, as well as many of the general cooperation benefits provided by all types of institutions. LCIs are poorly-suited for creating and enforcing binding commitments, but can perform many other governance functions, alone and as complements to treaty-based institutions. We argue that the availability of LCIs changes the cost–benefit logic of institutional choice in a densely institutionalized international system, making the creation of new institutions, which existing research sees as the ‘last resort’, more likely. In addition, LCIs empower executive, bureaucratic, and societal actors, incentivizing those actors to favor creating LCIs rather than treaty-based institutions. The availability of LCIs affects global governance in multiple ways. It reduces the status quo bias of governance, changes its institutional and actor composition, enables (modest) cooperation in times of polarization and gridlock, creates beneficial institutional divisions of labor, and expands governance options. At the same time, the proliferation of LCIs reduces the focality of incumbent institutions, increasing the complexity of governance

Black Ships and Balance Sheets: The Japanese Market and U.S.-Japan Relations

In this Article, Professors Abbott and Totman address the widespread Western belief that the Japanese economy is unfairly closed to foreign trade and investment. The authors identify several levels of barriers to penetration of the Japanese market. They contend that considerable progress has been made in reducing direct official restraints and official non-tariff barriers. Further progress in resolving the closed market issue, the authors predict, will be more difficult. Some of the remaining problems are rooted in Japanese society and culture; others in Western attitudes toward Japan. All reflect the historical pattern of Japan\u27s relations with the West. The authors conclude with recommendations for Japanese and American policy aimed at resolving the closed market issue while maintaining amicable relations

Black Ships and Balance Sheets: The Japanese Market and U.S.-Japan Relations

In this Article, Professors Abbott and Totman address the widespread Western belief that the Japanese economy is unfairly closed to foreign trade and investment. The authors identify several levels of barriers to penetration of the Japanese market. They contend that considerable progress has been made in reducing direct official restraints and official non-tariff barriers. Further progress in resolving the closed market issue, the authors predict, will be more difficult. Some of the remaining problems are rooted in Japanese society and culture; others in Western attitudes toward Japan. All reflect the historical pattern of Japan\u27s relations with the West. The authors conclude with recommendations for Japanese and American policy aimed at resolving the closed market issue while maintaining amicable relations